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In Evolutionary Dynamics the understanding of cooperative phenomena in natural and social systems has
been the subject of intense research during decades. We focus attention here on the so-called ”Lattice Reci-
procity” mechanisms that enhance evolutionary survival of the cooperative phenotype in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game when the population of darwinian replicators interact through a fixed network of social contacts. Exact
results on a ”Dipole Model” are presented, along with a mean-field analysis as well as results from extensive
numerical Monte Carlo simulations. The theoretical framework used is that of standard Statistical Mechanics of
macroscopic systems, but with no energy considerations. We illustrate the power of this perspective on social
modeling, by consistently interpreting the onset of lattice reciprocity as a thermodynamical phase transition that,
moreover, cannot be captured by a purely mean-field approach.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Kg, 87.23.Ge, 89.75.Fb
I. INTRODUCTION
Is the term ”social temperature” just a rhetoric figure (sug-
gestive metaphor), or on the contrary, could it be given a
precise meaning? By working out in detail the Evolutionary
Dynamics of the most studied social dilemma (the Prisoner’s
Dilemma) on a simple kind of artificial social networks we
will show here that the formal framework of Equilibrium Sta-
tistical Mechanics is, to a large extent, applicable to the rigor-
ous description of the asymptotic behavior of strategic evolu-
tion, thus providing the key for a formal quantitative meaning
of the term social ”temperature” in these contexts.
Evolutionary game theory, in contrast with classical game
theory that focusses on the decision making process of (ra-
tional) agents, is concerned with entire populations of agents
programmed to use some strategy in their interactions with
other agents. The agents are replicators, i.e. entities which
have the means of making copies of themselves (by inheri-
tance, learning, infection, imitation, etc...), whose reproduc-
tive success depends on the payoff obtained during interac-
tion. As the payoff depends on the current composition of
strategies among the interacting agents, this yields a feedback
loop that drives the evolution of the strategic state of the pop-
ulation [1, 2, 3, 4].
This Darwinian feedback (frequency-dependent fitness) dy-
namics depends strongly not only on the particular game, and
on the specifics of the way strategies spread, but also on the
(social) structure of connections describing the interactions.
Under the assumption of a well-mixed population (social pan-
mixia assumption), the temporal evolution of the proportion of
strategies among the population is governed by a differential
equation named replicator equation (see below). Well-known
celebrated folk’s theorems (see, e.g. [3]) establish a connec-
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tion between the asymptotic behavior of this equation and the
powerful concepts of classical game theory based on the no-
tion of best reply (Nash). However, if the social panmixia
assumption is abandoned, and individuals only interact with
their neighbors in a social network, the asymptotic of evolu-
tionary dynamics generically differ in a substantial way from
this ”well-mixed population” description. The social structure
of strategic interactions turns out to be of importance regard-
ing the evolutionary outcome of the strategic competition.
We will consider here the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), a two-
players-two-strategies game, where each player chooses one
of the two available strategies, cooperation or defection: A
cooperator receives R when playing with a cooperator, and
S when playing with a defector, while a defector earns P
when playing with a defector, and T (temptation) against a
cooperator. When T > R > P > S, the game is a PD
(while if T > R > S > P it is called Snowdrift game, also
”Chicken” or ”Hawks and Doves”). Given the payoff’s or-
dering, whatever the value of the prior assign of probability
to the co-player’s strategy is, the expected payoff is higher
for defection, and that is what a rational agent should choose.
In the PD game only the defective strategy is a strict best re-
sponse to itself and to cooperation, thus it is an easy example
of game with an unbeatable [4] strategy. Still, though there
is no difficulty in the making of the strategic decision from
Nash analysis, two cooperators are better off than two defec-
tors, hence the Social Dilemma.
In graph-structured populations, a large body of research
[5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12] (and references therein) on evolution-
ary dynamics of the PD game has convincingly show the so-
called lattice reciprocity effects: The cooperative phenotype
can take advantage of the topology of the social net, so that
clusters of cooperators are often resilient to invasion by the
(continuum-unbeatable) defective phenotype. This enhance-
ment of asymptotic macroscopic levels of cooperation due to
the structure and topology of strategic interactions includes,
but it is far more general than, the so-called space reciprocity
mechanisms, where social nets are discretizations (solid state
2lattices) of the euclidian space, and diffusion approximations
are often useful [13]. In this regard, one should stress the
accumulated evidence that (i) many interesting social nets
[14, 15, 16] are far away from being regular lattices, and (ii)
freedom of connectivity scales (scale-free complex networks)
enhances [17, 18, 19, 20] the lattice reciprocity mechanisms
up to unexpectedly high values of the temptation parameter
T of the dilemma, where cooperation is very expensive (but
affordable in an evolutionary sense).
In this paper we investigate in detail the lattice reciprocity
mechanisms in an artificial network (Dipole Model) that mod-
els the competition for influence on a population of social PD-
imitators of two antagonist Big Brothers (nodes connected to
the whole population, but with no direct connection between
them). The paper is organized as follows. The setting of evo-
lutionary scenario [(a) game, (b) updating rule, and (c) net-
work of social contacts] along with basic concepts and def-
initions, are given in section II, where the Dipole Model is
introduced. This is a closed system with a self-sustained evo-
lutionary activity (non-trivial dynamics) of social cooperation,
as we prove in section III, where also the applicability of stan-
dard Equilibrium Statistical Mechanics to the Dipole Model is
assessed.
Explicit exact solutions of the evolutionary equilibrium
probability measure of microstates are obtained in section IV,
for some special topologies of the fluctuating replicators sub-
populationF . There, we analyze first the two trivial limits for
the graph structure of the target population F , namely com-
plete graph and totally disconnected graph. One easily obtains
an exact macroscopic (infinite size limit, or thermodynamical
limit) description for both cases by means of explicit differ-
ential equations for the macroscopic cooperation in subsec-
tions IV A and IV B. A simple thermodynamical interpreta-
tion of the macroscopic behavior, is provided by the theorem
of section III, as we briefly outline. For a simple ”random
regular graph” topology of F , an explicit differential equation
and simple thermodynamical predictions are obtained within
a mean-field approximation in subsection IV C. When com-
pared to Monte Carlo numerical results, fundamental discrep-
ancies are evidenced: while mean-field prediction does not
show any critical behavior, our numerical results show beyond
any doubt the existence of a thermodynamical phase transition
at a critical value of the temptation T ∗. This critical value
separates apart two distinct macroscopic phases of the fluc-
tuating population, and signals the onset of macroscopic ef-
fects of lattice reciprocity. These effects are seen to operate
as positive feedback upon local fluctuations of the strategic
neighborhoods, and thus they cannot be captured by ”purely
mean-field” macroscopic approaches.
The concluding section V tries to call interdisciplinary at-
tention on the wide and utmost interesting prospectives for
Statistical Physics ”concepts and methods” in current studies
on Evolutionary Dynamics and Social Systems modelling in
general.
II. NATURAL STRATEGIC SELECTION ON GRAPHS.
We specify here the evolutionary game dynamics scenario,
meaning the game parametrization, the microscopic strategic
dynamics (replication mechanism or strategic updating rule),
and the social structure of contacts that we will consider along
the paper.
We normalize the PD payoffs to the reward for cooperating,
R = 1, and fix the null payoff at punishment P = 0. Note
that provided the (differential or relative) selective advantage
among two individuals depends on their payoff’s difference
(see below), one can arbitrarily fix the zero payoff level. Then
only two parameters T = b > 1 and R = ǫ < 0 are tuned.
Note that the range ǫ > 0 defines a game named Hawks and
Doves (also Chicken and Snowdrift) where punishment and
sucker’s payoff have the reverse order. We will occasionally
comment on this range of parameters.
Moreover, we do not restrict our computations to 2R >
T + S. This restriction means that the total payoff for the two
players is higher if both cooperate (2R) than if one cooperates
and the other defects (T + S), and is usually incorporated in
iterated games studies of the PD to prevent agents taking turns
at defection and then sharing the payoffs. For the specifics of
the replicator dynamics (memory-less, markovian) in the next
paragraph, one should not expect that this restriction qualita-
tively matters.
Regarding the replication mechanism, we implement the fi-
nite population (size N ≫ 1) analogue of replicator dynamics
[17, 21]. At each time step t, which represents one generation
of the discrete evolutionary time, each agent i plays once with
each one of the agents in its neighborhood and accumulates
the obtained payoffs, Pi. Then, the individuals, i, update syn-
chronously their strategies by picking up at random a neigh-
bor, j, and comparing their respective payoffs Pi and Pj . If
Pi > Pj , nothing happens and i keeps the same strategy for
the next generation. On the contrary, if Pj > Pi, with proba-
bility Πi→j = β(Pj−Pi), i adopts the strategy of its neighbor
j for the next round robin with its neighbors, before which all
payoffs are reset to zero. Here β is a number small enough to
make Πi→j an acceptable probability; its physical meaning is
related to the characteristic inverse time scale: the larger it is,
the faster evolution takes place.
From a theoretical point of view, this specific choice of the
dynamics has the virtue of leading directly (see, e.g. [2]), un-
der the hypothesis of a well-mixed population and very large
population size, to the celebrated replicator equation for the
frequencies pα of strategies α(= C or D) in the population:
p˙α = pα(fα − f¯) (1)
where fα is the payoff of an α-strategist and f¯ is the aver-
age payoff for the whole population. Note that time unit in
equation (1) is scaled to β−1.
For the payoffs of the Prisoner’s Dilemma the asymptotic
frequency of cooperators, from the replicator equation, is
driven to extinction, pc = 0, while for the Hawks and Doves
game, its asymptotic value is ǫ/(b − 1 + ǫ) . As stated in the
introductory section, we will be concerned here mainly with
3populations that are not well-mixed, where predictions based
on this nonlinear differential equation are often of little use.
Regarding the structure of connections between interact-
ing agents, we will consider here that it is given by a fixed
graph (i.e. connections between players do not change by
rewiring) where agents are represented by nodes, and a link
between nodes indicates that they interact (play). If ki is
the number of neighbors of agent i (connectivity or degree),
and ∆ is the maximal possible one-shot-payoff difference
(∆ = max{b, b−ǫ}), we will assume β = (max{ki, kj}∆)−1
for the specification of the probability Πi→j of invasion of
node i by the strategy of neighbor j. This simple choice, in-
troduced in [17], assures that Πi→j < 1; in heterogeneous
networks it has also the effect of slowing down the invasion
processes from or to highly connected nodes, with respect
to the rate of invasion processes between poorly connected
nodes, a feature not without consequences [22].
We now introduce some notation, which is familiar to statis-
tical physicists: The configuration (strategic microstate l) of a
population of N agents at time t is specified by the sequence
l = {si(t)} (i = 1, ..., N ), where si(t) = 1 (or 0) denotes that
node i is at this time a cooperator (resp. defector). The set of
all possible 2N configurations is called the phase space. Sta-
tionary probability densities of microstatesP(l) (l = 1, ...2N )
are then representatives of strategic macro-states. The aver-
age cooperation cl of microstate l is defined as
cl =
1
N
N∑
i
si (2)
We denote by Πl′l the probability that the strategic mi-
crostate of the population at time t+1 is l′, provided that it is
l at time t. Note that
∑
l′ Πl′l = 1. A microstate lˆ is a frozen
equilibrium configuration if the probability that it changes in
one time step is null, and then Π
lˆlˆ
= 1 and Π
l′ lˆ
= 0 if l′ 6= lˆ.
We will assume generic real values (irrational) of the payoff
parameters, so that if a configuration contains a C-D link it
cannot be a frozen configuration. The only possible frozen
equilibrium configurations are all-C and all-D. However, for
a very wide class of graphs, and a wide range of model pa-
rameters they are not the only possible stationary probability
measures.
We now illustrate by means of easy examples the evolution
of PD on graphs. Our first and simplest example is a star-
shaped graph consisting of a central node connected to N − 1
peripheral nodes. It is straightforward to check that any initial
condition with cooperators at the central node and (at least) at
Int[(b− ǫ(N − 1))/(1 − ǫ)] + 1 peripheral nodes has a posi-
tive probability of evolving in one time step to a configuration
with a higher number of cooperators, and a null probability
of evolving towards less cooperators. Thus, all those config-
urations evolve asymptotically to the all-C equilibrium. The
rest of configurations evolve towards the all-D equilibrium.
Therefore, if N > (b−ǫ+2) both equilibria are attractors (ab-
sorbing states), in the sense that some configurations different
from themselves evolve to them; the phase space is partitioned
into two basins of attraction. If N < b− ǫ+ 2, only the all-D
frozen equilibrium is attractor. The stationary probability den-
sities P∗(l) of the star are pure point measures (two- or one-
Dirac delta peaks) in the thermodynamical limit N →∞.
Now take a star and add some arbitrary number of links
between its peripheral nodes. We call this network a crown,
whose head is the central node. If the head is occupied at t0
by a defector, it will remain so forever, because the payoff of
a peripheral cooperator is strictly lower than head’s payoff.
Sooner or later the head (center) of the crown will be imitated
by the whole crown, and the evolution will stop when every-
body be defecting. But, what happens to a cooperator on the
head? The answer is dependent on both, the net topology of
the crown periphery and the cooperators disposition there: To
ensure fixation of cooperation at the head node, it suffices that
a subset C of peripheral nodes occupied by cooperators, and
with no direct links to the rest of the periphery, have a size
nC > bkmax − ǫ(N − nC − 1), where kmax is the maximal
degree in the rest of the periphery. Under this proviso all-C
is the unique absorbing microstate of all corresponding initial
conditions.
Finally consider the graph schematized in Fig. 1, composed
of the following:
(a) A componentF of nF nodes with arbitrary connections
among them.
(b) A node, say node 1, that is connected to all the nodes in
F and has no other links.
(c) A component C of nC nodes with arbitrary connections
among them.
(d) A node, say node 2, that is connected to all the nodes in
F and C, but not to node 1.
This is what we will call a Dipole Model Network. It is a
two-headed (nodes 1 and 2) crown (with periphery F ) plus a
tail C hanging on head 2. To strength the special status of the
head nodes, let us nickname them as ”Big Brothers”. They
certainly enjoy a sort of omnipresence that fits well with the
character of Orwell’s famous social sci-fiction novel 1984. In
the following section we prove that for this simple network
there exists a non-trivial stationary probability density of mi-
crostates P∗(l) for the strategic evolution of the PD game.
III. THE DIPOLE MODEL.
The analysis of Evolutionary Dynamics of the PD on the
Dipole network shows that there is a non-trivial invariant mea-
sure in phase space. Let us consider the set I of initial con-
ditions defined by: (i) Big Brother 1 is a defector, (ii) Big
Brother 2 is a cooperator, and (iii) all nodes in component
C are cooperators. Note that this set contains 2nF different
configurations. We now prove that, provided some sufficient
conditions, this is a minimally invariant set of the evolutionary
dynamics.
First, one realizes that Big Brother 1 cannot be invaded by
the cooperative strategy: The payoff of a cooperator node i in
F is P ci = kci + 1 + ǫ(ki − kci + 1), where ki is the number
of its neighbors in F and kci ≤ ki is the number of those
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FIG. 1: Structure of the Dipole Network. Two nodes (1 and 2) are
connected to all nodes in F , whose elements can be arbitrarily linked
to each other. Moreover, node 2 is also linked to a set C (with arbi-
trary internal connections as well). See the text for further details.
that are cooperators. The payoff of Big Brother 1 (BB1) is
then P1 ≥ (kci + 1)b. For the PD game, where ǫ ≤ 0, the
inequality P1 > P ci always holds, so that BB 1 will always be
a defector. (Note also that for the Hawks and Doves game, a
sufficient condition for P1 > P ci is b > 1 + ǫ(kF + 1), where
kF (< nF ) is the maximal degree in component F , i.e. the
maximal number of links that a node in F shares within F .)
We thus conclude that defection is fixed at BB 1.
Second, thanks to its interaction with set C, Big Brother
2 resists invasion, provided its size nC is above a threshold:
The payoff of a defector node i in F is P di = (kci +1)b, where
kci is the number of its cooperator neighbors in F , while the
payoff of Big Brother 2 (BB2) is P2 = nC+nF ǫ+ncF (1−ǫ),
where ncF ≤ nF is the number of cooperators in F . Thus, a
sufficient condition for P2 > P di is nC > Int(b(kF + 1) −
nF ǫ). With this proviso, BB2 will always be a cooperator,
which in turn implies that all the nodes in the component C
will remain always cooperators.
The previous argument proves that provided the sufficient
conditions nC > Int(b(kF +1)−ǫnF ) and b > 1+ǫ(kF +1)
hold, the subset I of phase space defined by (i), (ii), and (iii)
is an invariant set. As this set does not contain equilibria, no
stochastic trajectory evolves from it to a frozen equilibrium
configuration.
Finally, one realizes that I is indeed minimal, because at
any time, a defector in F has a positive probability to be in-
vaded by the cooperation strategy (from BB2), and a cooper-
ator in F has a positive probability of being invaded by the
defection strategy (from BB1). Therefore, any strategic con-
figuration of the set I is reachable in one time step from any
other, i.e. for all pairs (l, l′) of microstates in I, the transition
probability Πl′l > 0. Consequently, I does not contain proper
invariant subsets: it is minimally invariant. Moreover, follow-
ing Perron-Frobenius theorem, there exists a unique equilib-
rium macro-state P∗(l). This provides a rigorous framework
for the interpretation of results from numerical Monte Carlo
simulation studies in Evolutionary Dynamics on Dipole mod-
els, provided the sufficient conditions above.
While nodes in C and Big Brother 2 are permanent coop-
erators, and Big Brother 1 is a permanent defector, nodes in
F are forced to fluctuate. This partition of the network into
sets of nodes where each particular strategy is fixed forever,
and a set of fluctuating nodes, turns out to be a generic fea-
ture of the discrete replicator dynamics (neighbor imitation
proportional to payoffs difference) on many network settings
[18, 19]. The simplicity of the Dipole Network model allows
on it an easy formal proof of existence of this partition, so pro-
viding an illustration of both, its origins and generic character.
It also shows the formal applicability of Equilibrium Statisti-
cal Physics formalism to characterize the asymptotic behavior
of Evolutionary Dynamics on these graphs. This will be made
in the next section for specific choices of structural traits for
the subgraph F .
The name dipole for this structure of connections is sug-
gested by the strategic polar (C −F −D) aspect of the whole
graph. Note also that the number of C−F andF−D connec-
tions scales linearly with the size nF of the fluctuating interior,
that is to say that the poles (C and D) act as an externally im-
posed (AC) field on F , whose strength is proportional to the
internal levels of cooperation. As the cooperation (and then
the fitness) levels are self-sustained (as proved by the pre-
vious theorem), this is a closed macroscopic system with a
non-trivial self-sustained social activity of cooperation at evo-
lutionary equilibrium.
The interest of the Dipole Model is by no means restricted
to a mere academic illustration: First of all, we can make a
technical use of it in macroscopic stability analysis studies
of PD-evolution on highly heterogeneous complex networks.
Indeed, the fluctuations inside the subset F are the effect of
the competition for invasion among two non-neighboring hubs
(hugely connected nodes), where opposite pure strategies have
reached fixation, in their common neighborhood. This is a
local strategic configuration that mimics those that are often
observed in stochastic simulations of evolutionary dynamics
in highly heterogeneous (scale-free) networks [18, 19]. Sim-
ple multipolar network models can easily be constructed (e.g.
by establishing direct links from C to F in a way that simple
sufficient conditions guarantee that the theorem still holds),
that are indeed indistinguishable from typical strategic pat-
terns found in the numerical simulations on scale-free net-
works. This makes the Dipole net a very useful technical
device to analyze the stability mechanisms of the cooperator
clusters [18, 19] in scale-free structured populations, as well
as the kind of temporal fluctuations of cooperation that one
should expect in the fluctuating set of nodes.
Regarding potentialities for Econo-Socio-Physics applica-
tions of the Dipole model, it could be viewed as a sort of
schematic (then simplistic, cartoon-like) model for the com-
petition for influence of two powerful superstructural institu-
tions (e.g. like ”mass media”, political parties, or lobbies) on
a target population, in strongly polarized strategic contexts.
The analysis rigorously provides sufficient conditions for the
parameter values where fixation of strategic traits is proved
impossible, so that temporal fluctuations dominate forever the
target population of social imitators F . The influence on each
individual of the two competing institutions is simulated here
through the omnipresent (”Big Brother” nodes 1 and 2) neigh-
5bors, whose own high appeal for imitation (the strength of
Big Brother’s influence) is in turn conditioned by the strategic
composition of the target population. Here the interest could
well be the study of the influence that metric and topologi-
cal network characteristics of the social structure have on the
strategic macro-state, and thus on the quantitative values of
social indicators. We address some aspects of this issue in the
next section.
At a more general level, the design of experiments in Social
Sciences as well as theoretical studies of Artificial Societies
could greatly benefit from having at hand simple but non-
trivial ”exactly soluble statistical-mechanical models” that
may provide safe guides to develop further intuitions on so-
cial phenomena that demands more comprehension.
IV. THE ROLE OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN BIG
BROTHERS COMPETITION.
In this section we present some analytical and numerical
results on the evolutionary dynamics of games in the Dipole
Model for different choices of topologies of the fluctuating set
F . The sufficient conditions stated in the previous section are
assumed hereafter. We are interested in the situation where
nF ≫ 1, i.e. large size of the fluctuating population. First we
will analyze in IV A the straightforward limiting case when
the macroscopic set F is a fully connected set. This is the
well-mixed population limit, where replicator equation is an
exact description. Next in subsection IV B we will explicitly
solve the opposite trivial case of disconnectedF set (kF = 0),
which turns out to reduce to the standard textbook ideal two-
states model of Statistical Physics. After that, in subsection
IV C, the ”random regular” network structure for F is seen
to be amenable to a plausible mean-field approach, but insuf-
ficient to explain the phenomenology shown by Monte Carlo
numerical results. These show beyond any doubt a critical be-
havior, a transition point separating two qualitatively different
types of social macro-states. This transition is sensibly inter-
preted as the onset of lattice reciprocity. In other words, lattice
reciprocity is a true critical social phenomenon.
A. Well-mixed population limit.
We now show that the well-mixed population assumption in
the macroscopic set F leads in the thermodynamic limit to the
standard replicator equation: Assume that each node in F is
connected to all nodes in F , and to BB1 and BB2. The degree
of each of them is thus nF+1, and the parameter kF = nF−1.
The sufficient conditions for fixation of defection at node 1
and of cooperation at node 2 are respectively, b > 1 + ǫnF
(that always hold for the PD), and nC > Int(nF (b− ǫ)). The
payoffs of polar nodes 1 and 2 are given by
P1 = bcnF , P2 = nC + cnF + ǫ(1− c)nF , (3)
while the payoffs of a cooperator node and a defector node in
F are
Pc = cnF+ǫ(nF−cnF+1) , ; Pd = (cnF+1)b . (4)
To compute the invasion probabilities, QDC and QCD, one
first easily realizes that Pc < Pd, provided the sufficient con-
dition (b > 1 + ǫnF ) for fixation of defection at node 1. Thus
the (one time step) probability QDC of invasion of a coopera-
tor node in F is
QDC =
1
(nF + 1)
P1 − Pc
∆(nF + 1)
+
(1− c)nF
(nF + 1)
Pd − Pc
∆(nF + 1)
, (5)
and the probability QCD of invasion of a defector node in F
is
QCD =
1
(nF + 1)
P2 − Pd
∆(nF + nC)
. (6)
At time t+ 1, the expected fraction of cooperators is:
c(t+ 1) = c(t)(1 −QDC) + (1− c(t))QCD . (7)
Assuming that the size of F is macroscopic, nF ≫ 1, the
fraction of cooperators c in F evolves according to the differ-
ential equation
c˙ = (1− c)QCD − cQDC . (8)
Now, if nF ≫ 1, and nC/(nF )2 → 0, then both QCD and
the first term in the right-hand side of (5) vanish, and we arrive
to the differential equation
c˙ =
c(1− c)
∆
(ǫ(1− c)− (b− 1)c) . (9)
As expected, with a simple re-scaling of time, equation (9)
is no other than the replicator equation (1): note that in the
limit nF ≫ 1 that we have considered, the probability that
a node in F picks up a Big Brother when updating its strat-
egy is negligible, and then the evolution inside the complete
graph F is overwhelmingly determined by the internal con-
nections, and thus by the replicator equation. In other words,
in this limit of maximal possible connectivity, BB1 and BB2
are no longer bigger than the nodes inF and their influence on
the fluctuating set is negligibly small in the thermodynamical
limit.
Note however that as far as nF is finite, the Theorem in
section III still hold, and a chance for the fluctuating activity
inside F remains. We now turn attention to situations where
kF ≪ nF , far from the social panmixia.
6B. F is a disconnected graph (ideal-gas)
Let us now obtain some explicit results for one of the sim-
plest choices for the topology of connections inside the fluctu-
ating set, namely kF = 0. In this case each node in F is only
connected to Big Brothers. This is in fact an effective single
node problem, where homogeneity assumption in F is exact;
in other words, the absence of internal interactions in the set
F is a sort of ideal-gas condition easy to deal with in the large
size limit.
1. A differential equation for c
Note that the sufficient conditions for fixation of defection
at BB1 and of cooperation at BB2 are respectively, b > 1 + ǫ,
and nC > b − ǫnF . Denoting by c(t) the instantaneous frac-
tion of cooperators in F , the payoffs of Big Brothers are given
by (3), and the payoffs of a cooperator node and a defector
node in F are, respectively,
Pc = 1 + ǫ , Pd = b . (10)
Then one finds for the (one time step) probability QDC of
invasion of a cooperator node in F
QDC =
cb− (1 + ǫ)/nF
2∆
, (11)
and using the notation A = ǫ + (nC − b)/nF and B = 1 +
nC/nF
QCD =
A+ c(1− ǫ)
2∆B
, (12)
for the probability of invasion of a defector node in F . Note
that A > 0 due to the non-invasion of BB2 (sufficient) condi-
tion.
Provided nF ≫ 1, the fraction of cooperators c in F
evolves according to the differential equation (8), which af-
ter insertion of expressions (11) and (12), and re-scaling of
time, becomes
c˙ = f(c) ≡ A0 +A1c+A2c
2 , (13)
where the coefficients are
A0 = A , (14)
A1 = 1− ǫ−A+B(1 + ǫ)/nF , (15)
A2 = −(1− ǫ+ bB) , (16)
One can easily check (A0 > 0 and A2 < 0) that there is
always one positive root c∗ of f(c), which is the asymptotic
value for any initial condition 0 ≤ c(0) ≤ 1 of equation (13).
In this asymptotic regime, the one time step invasion probabil-
ities, QDC and QCD, become time independent and one can
then compute the probability that the cooperation strategy re-
mains for a time τc ≥ 1 (permanence time of cooperation) at a
fluctuating node, simply as P (τc) = QDC(1−QDC)τc−1. In
a similar way, the distribution density P (τd) of defection per-
manence times is obtained as P (τd) = QCD(1−QCD)τd−1.
Thus the distribution densities of both strategies permanence
time are exponentially decreasing.
For ǫ = 0, in the so called weak PD game (i.e. at the bor-
der between the PD and the Hawks and Doves game), if one
further assumes that the relative size µ(F ) of the component
F is large enough, i.e. µ(F ) → 1, and µ(C) → 0, one easily
obtains that the stationary solution of equation (13) behaves
as c∗ ≃ (b + 1)−1 near the limit µ(F ) → 1. The distribu-
tion density P (τc) of the cooperation permanence times of a
fluctuating node, as a function of the parameter b is thus
P (τc) = (2b+ 1)
−1
(
2b+ 1
2b+ 2
)τc
, (17)
and the distribution density P (τd) of defection permanence
times
P (τd) = (2b(b+ 1)− 1)
−1
(
2b(b+ 1)− 1
2b(b+ 1)
)τd
, (18)
These distribution densities characterize the pace of inva-
sion cycles at a fluctuating node in the (asymptotic) equilib-
rium strategic macroscopic state.
2. A formal thermodynamical approach
From the point of view of the set F , when nF ≫ 1, the
model corresponds to a non-interacting (ideal) set of indepen-
dent phenotypic strategists that fluctuate due to a polar field
(Big Brothers influence) whose strength is self-consistently
determined by the average cooperation c. This problem is
equivalent to that of an ideal paramagnetic salt in a noisy (tele-
graphic) magnetic AC field of intensity proportional to the av-
erage magnetization.
A typical and correct statistical-physicists approach ”from
scratch” to this two-states model is the familiar micro-
canonical setting: At (dynamical) macroscopic equilibrium,
the probability of each strategic micro-state l = {si} of fixed
value of cl = c is uniform
Pl = Ω
−1 , (19)
where Ω = nF !/((cnF )!(nF − cnF )!)) is their number. The
lack of information S = lnΩ of the macro-state as a function
of global cooperation nF c, i.e. the relation S(nF c), can be
regarded as the micro-canonical fundamental ”thermodynam-
ical” relation, and its first derivative is the intensive parameter
β, that after using Stirling’s approximation is easily obtained
as
β = ln
(
1− c
c
)
. (20)
7This is an equation of state, which simply expresses the
connection of the equilibrium value of the macroscopic coop-
eration level c to the ”entropic” intensive parameter β. Note
that c is determined by the balance condition (c˙ = 0):
1− c
c
=
QDC
QCD
, (21)
from where equation of state (20) determines β as a function
of model parameters (i.e. b, ǫ, and nC/nF ). For example,
when ǫ = 0, β = ln b > 0, indicating that the disorder of the
activity increases with increasing cooperation. The maximal
value of β →∞ corresponds to zero disorder (b→∞), while
its minimal zero value corresponds to highest possible value
(at b = 1) of cooperation (c = (1/2)). Note that lower values
of b (b < 1) correspond to negative β values, where entropy
decreases with increasing values of cooperation, outside the
PD domain (Stag Hunt game domain, see [23]).
An alternative (and equivalent in the thermodynamic limit)
setting is to consider the whole space of 2nF configura-
tions l = {si}nFi=1, of unrestricted cl, but under the con-
dition that the average value c =
∑
l Plcl is fixed. That
is the familiar canonical setting. The normalization factor
Z =
∑
l exp(−βcl) is the canonical partition function (Boltz-
mann’s Zustandsumme), that due to independence (k = 0) is
easily factorized as (1 + exp(−β))nF .
In the canonical setting a most informative macroscopic
quantity is the ”heat capacity” analog: The fluctuations of cl
along representative (typical) stochastic trajectories at equi-
librium under the evolutionary dynamics of the game are,
following the standard thermodynamical formalism given by
∂c/∂(β−1), so that this quantitative social indicator detects
very precisely sudden variations of macroscopic cooperation
with payoff’s parameters. In this ideal-gas kind of case there
are no critical points and fluctuations do not diverge. For ex-
ample, for ǫ = 0 they are given by the (Bernouillian) binomial
variance nF c(1− c) = nF b/(b+ 1)2.
C. F is a random regular graph
Random regular networks are random networks of fixed de-
gree k. All nodes being thus equivalent, a sensible approach is
to assume (mean-field like) that the fraction of instantaneous
cooperators in the neighborhood of a node is the fraction c
of the whole set F . In other words, one neglects local fluc-
tuations of c. The contribution of the internal interactions to
the variation of c is then of the ”replicator equation” type, as
discussed above for the complete graph case. The difference
here is that if kF ≪ nF the contribution of the interactions
with Big Brothers cannot be longer neglected.
1. Mean-field approximation
The payoffs of Big Brothers BB1 and BB2 are given by
equation (3), and the payoffs of a cooperator node and a de-
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FIG. 2: Macroscopic cooperation in a random regular graph structure
for the set F , with k = 4, and nF = 4000, and ǫ = 0. A decreasing
sequence of nC/nF , as indicated in figure, has been used. Symbols
represent numerical Monte Carlo results, and the different lines rep-
resent the mean-field predictions as given by the solution (c˙ = 0) of
Eq. (24).
fector node at F under the mean-field assumption are:
Pc = ck+1+ ǫ(k(1− c)+ 1) , Pd = (ck+1)b . (22)
The differential equation for c is then
c˙ =
(1 − c)(P2 − Pd)
(k + 2)BnF∆
−
c(P1 − Pc)
(k + 2)nF∆
+
(1− c)ck(Pc − Pd)
(k + 2)2∆
, (23)
which under the assumption kb≪ nF , takes the form
c˙ = f(c) ≡
1
(k + 2)2B∆
(A′
0
+A′
1
c+A′
2
c2+A′
3
c3) , (24)
where the coefficients are
A′
0
= (k + 2)(B − 1 + ǫ) , (25)
A′
1
= 2(2(1− ǫ)−B) + k(2(1− ǫ)−B(b − ǫ))
+k2Bǫ , (26)
A′
2
= 2(ǫ− 1−Bb) + k(ǫ− 1−B(1 + ǫ))
+k2B(1− b− 2ǫ) , (27)
A′
3
= k2B(b − 1 + ǫ) , (28)
Note that the assumption nC > b − nF ǫ (i.e. the condition
for Big Brother 2 to be a permanent cooperator) implies that
A′
0
> 0, so that c˙(0) > 0 and one positive root, say c∗, of f(c)
is then ensured, in agreement with the theorem of section III.
2. A social phase transition, and the mean-field failure.
We now adopt the statistical mechanics formal perspec-
tive, and proceed to explicitly compute the equilibrium macro-
state, i.e. the stationary probability distribution density P∗l ,
inside the mean-field approximation.
8Let us consider two different (arbitrary) strategic mi-
crostates l = {si} (i = 1, ..., nF ), and l′ = {s′i}, of the
fluctuating set. For any pair of microstates (l, l′) we define
the following numbers:
n11 =
∑
i
δsi,s′iδs′i,1 , (29)
n10 =
∑
i
(1− δsi,s′i)δs′i,0 , (30)
n00 =
∑
i
δsi,s′iδs′i,0 , (31)
n01 =
∑
i
(1− δsi,s′i)δs′i,1 , (32)
i.e., n11 is the number of nodes that are cooperators in both
microstates, n10 that of the nodes that are cooperators in l but
defectors in l′, etc... Using equation (2) it is straightforward
to obtain
cl − cl′ =
1
nF
(n10 − n01) . (33)
Now, let us assume that the probabilities that a node i
changes strategy are independent of node i (homogeneity as-
sumption, mean-field), and denote them by QCD (transition
from defector to cooperator) and QDC (for the transition from
cooperator to defector). Then we can easily see that the tran-
sition probabilities between the microstates l and l′ are given
by
Πl,l′ = (1−QDC)
n11(1−QCD)
n00Qn01DCQ
n10
CD, (34)
Πl′,l = (1−QDC)
n11(1−QCD)
n00Qn10DCQ
n01
CD, (35)
Henceforth, denoting exp(−β) = QCD/QDC , one easily
obtains the expression:
Πl,l′ exp(−βcl′nF ) = Πl′,l exp(−βclnF ) , (36)
from where the unique solution to the fixed point equation
Πl,l′P
∗
l′ = P
∗
l , (37)
is easily found to be:
P∗l = Z
−1 exp(−βclnF ) , (38)
where Z is the canonical partition function
Z =
[
QCD +QDC
QDC
]nF
. (39)
As it is well-known [24], the canonical probability distri-
bution density (38) is the unique density that maximizes the
lack of information (entropy), S = −∑l Pl lnPl, among
those (compatible) densities that share a common value for
the macroscopic average of cooperation c =
∑
l Plcl. This
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FIG. 3: Fluctuations of cooperation in a random regular graph struc-
ture for the set F . The upper panel (a) shows, for k = 4, ǫ = 0,
nF = 4000, and a decreasing sequence of nC/nF values as indi-
cated, the fluctuations of cooperation observed in Monte Carlo sim-
ulations. The lower panel (b) shows the mean-field predictions. The
mean-field approach is shown in text to be unable to predict the ob-
served phase transition. This qualifies network reciprocity as a true
”critical” social phenomenon.
provides a standard thermodynamic meaning to the parameter
β: it is no other than the intensive entropic parameter associ-
ated to cooperation, that is, the Lagrange multiplier [25, 26]
associated to the restriction c =
∑
l Plcl on the compatible
measures (canonical restricted maximization of entropy), that
is:
β =
∂S
nF∂c
. (40)
The parameter β simply measures how fast the entropy of
the equilibrium macro-state increases versus global coopera-
tion variations. Its formal role is that of inverse thermodynam-
ical temperature. The fluctuations of the micro-states coop-
eration cl, namely (nF )2(
∑
l(Plc
2
l ) − (
∑
l Plcl)
2) are given
by nF c(1 − c). The dependence on the game and network
parameters b, ǫ, nC/nF , k of the fluctuations of cooperation
is obtained by solving for the cooperation equilibrium value
c˙ = 0 in (24), and plotted in figure for k = 4, ǫ = 0, and
decreasing values of the ratio nC/nF .
9To which extent the mean-field prediction fails for low val-
ues of the parameter nC/nF , can be appreciated by con-
fronting the prediction above with the results from Monte
Carlo simulations. There in figure we see how a peak in coop-
eration fluctuations is revealed, when nC/nF → 0, signaling
the occurrence of a phase transition between two qualitatively
different macroscopic behaviors, that correspond to low and
high temptation regimes. The mean-field assumption is thus
only valid if the payoff received from C by Big Brother 2 is
not negligible versus the size nF .
The reasons for the failure of the mean-field approximation
rely on the lattice reciprocity of internal interactions, which is
totally absent in the mean field approximation. Let us remind
here our remark above on the replicator-equation-type of ef-
fect of internal interactions in equation (13) because of the
mean-field assumption. The transition signaled by the diver-
gence of fluctuations at b∗ reveals the onset of internal lattice
reciprocity, a conclusion that we now substantiate (see also
appendix 1 below).
For b > b∗, say in the low-temperature (high temptation)
phase, the macro-state is dominated by fast defection inva-
sions on the relatively few nodes that are instantaneous co-
operators due to sporadic interactions with Big Brother 2. In
the appendix 1 we show that, in the low c and low nC/nF
regime, the BB-imitation events in a given node are typically
separated by intervals of time of about c−1 time units large.
In those large intervals when Big Brother 2’s influence is null,
the very few and mostly isolated instantaneous cooperators are
quickly invaded by defector internal neighbors. In this regime
lattice reciprocity has no chance to develop, and cooperation
is only weakly sustained by the sporadic influence of BB2.
On the contrary, for b < b∗ (high temperature, or low temp-
tation phase) the local fluctuations of the neighbors strate-
gic field favor the building up of clusters of cooperators that
resist invasions during time intervals that are comparable to
the characteristic time intervals between BB-imitation events.
Under these circumstances the ”extra payoff” that BB2 re-
ceives from C does not anymore need to be high in order to
sustain high levels of cooperation. Internal lattice reciprocity
enhances the probability of highly cooperative micro-states,
so that the macro-states below transition differs substantially
from those of the high-temptation phase. This was not cap-
tured by the mean-field approximation, for these effects re-
quire a sizable likelihood of occurrence for the local fluctu-
ations of the strategic field, and the neglect of them is all a
mean-field approach is based upon.
To summarize the discussion of the results shown in figure,
a random regular structure of interactions inside F is enough
to support lattice reciprocity mechanisms that cannot be cap-
tured by a simple mean-field approach. The onset of lattice
reciprocity is furthermore interpreted as a ”thermodynami-
cal” phase transition, in a rigorous formal sense (divergence
of the fluctuations of an extensive parameter, the cooperation
c). One is then lead to a sensible and precise formal frame-
work where such a term as ”social temperature” is not a vague
metaphor, but it denotes a truly quantitative parameter, a legit-
imate (measurable, observable) social indicator.
V. PROSPECTIVE REMARKS
The plausibility of a thermodynamical perspective on Evo-
lutionary game dynamics studies is not a new issue, for it
is somehow implicit (or at least connatural) to a body of re-
search literature on statistical mechanics of strategic interac-
tions [11, 27]. What our simple analysis here shows is that
it can sometimes be strengthened up to a formal interpreta-
tion of quantitative macroscopic social indicators as thermo-
dynamic quantities. In the extent that it helps to understand
and to quantitatively characterize the phenomenology of so-
cial and economical models, it should be recognized as a pow-
erful theoretical perspective. What is even more important,
this perspective emphasizes the central role of quantitative
(experimental, observational) studies in social sciences, and
could provide, in those contexts, alternate valuable meanings
to quantitative social indicators and even suggestions for new
and better ones.
Any ”general-physics” trained scientist recognizes that en-
tropy reasoning is an extraordinary powerful tool for the anal-
ysis of macroscopic behavior in (material) traditional-physics
systems. It turns out that some of the models (at least a bunch
of interesting ones) of social phenomena are to a large extent
amenable to a macroscopic description where thermodynam-
ical concepts have proved to be essential. Of course, some
notions like e.g. ”First Law of Thermodynamics” could be
often absent in these new contexts. However we emphasize
that the absence of energy as a variable in social models is not
a shortcoming for the applicability mutatis mutandi of many
aspects of the thermodynamical formalism to these models.
A word of caution is nevertheless worth here regarding typi-
cal system sizes in controlled social experiments, where finite
size effects could be hugely determinant.
Nowadays, it is somewhat generally accepted that Physics
in general, and Statistical Physics in particular, offers a power-
ful tool-box for problem solving in Social Sciences and many
other areas. Recent trends in cognitive science [28] have cor-
rectly emphasized the power of the ”diversity of perspectives”
in problem solving, so it does not come as a surprise that
adding physical perspectives to social models may sometimes
pave the way to the needed breakthrough. Perhaps one should
also wonder about the possibility of reverse flow in these in-
terdisciplinary approaches to Social Sciences. After all, the
proper use of a tool helps to its reshaping, and one could per-
haps expect some kind of feedback. In other words, is there
any new physics that we can learn from the study of Social and
Economic Complex Systems? Only the recourse to empirical
and quantitative methods in the study of social phenomena
may likely give clues for sensible answers to this question.
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1. Low c approximation
In order to simplify expressions we assume hereafter ǫ = 0
and k = 4, and denote δ = nC/nF . For the case of a random
regular graph structure of the fluctuating set F , the probability
ΠBBC←D that a instantaneous defector node chooses to imitate
Big Brother 2 (invasion event from BB2) is, to first order in
n−1F ,
ΠBBC←D =
1
(k + 2)
c+ δ
(1 + δ)b
(41)
while the probability ΠBBD←C of an invasion event from BB1
to an instantaneous cooperator node in F is, to first order in
n−1F ,
ΠBBD←C =
c
(k + 2)
(42)
Thus, for δ ≤ c, typical intervals between invasion events
from Big Brothers in a node are (of the order of) c−1 time units
large. For large values of the temptation, where the value of
c is expected to be very small, the dynamics is consequently
dominated, for typically very large intervals of time, by inter-
nal strategic interactions. Let us analyze them.
The internal neighbors of a cooperator i are overwhelm-
ingly likely instantaneous defectors in this ”low c” regime, so
that i will be quickly invaded by them. The only chance for
it to resist invasion would be that its instantaneous neighbor-
hood microstate had at least two cooperator neighbors and that
b < (3/2) (note that in this strategic configuration, the pay-
off of i is Pi = 3 and that of its typical defector neighbors is
2b). These neighborhood microstates (cooperative clusters)
are so rare fluctuations that low values of the temptation b
are necessary for their non-negligible occurrence. Provided
b is below the transition value, the resilience to invasion (lat-
tice reciprocity) of cooperative clusters enhances the likeli-
hood of these fluctuations, which in turn reinforces the clus-
ters resilience, and so on. This positive feedback mechanism
of cooperative fluctuations enhancement is thus what triggers
the transition to highly cooperative macro-states, and qualifies
lattice reciprocity as a critical social phenomenon.
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